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ABSTRACT: This article draws a distinction between a child’s possible right to freedom of religion 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and recognition of a child’s religious beliefs and 
religious experiences as may be relevant to the child’s best interests under the Australian Family Law 
Act (FLA). It does so by reviewing some of the key family law jurisprudence relating to the Exclusive 
Brethren (Brethren) in Australia. It is proposed that, despite the incorporation of the CRC in the FLA, 
the FLA does not confer any rights on a child to freedom of religion. As a result, the Family Court of 
Australia may consider a child’s religious beliefs as these are relevant to the child’s best interests under 
the FLA, but the Family Court cannot rely on the child having any religious rights per se under the FLA. 
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The cases in this article are about parenting orders for children whose parents 
were members of the Plymouth Brethren Christian Church (“Exclusive Brethren” 
or “Brethren”) in Australia. The country has been a relatively fertile field for 
Brethren family law jurisprudence. Several Brethren cases have been the subject 
of litigation in the Family Court of Australia (“Family Court”) lasting many years.  
Amongst the legal questions the various Brethren family law decisions have 
touched on but have not answered is a complex one: what if any religious rights 
does the child of separated Brethren parents have, to decide whether a parent 
should have custody? This article furthers the research in this field of religion and 
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family law by analyzing the legislative framework and body of family law 
jurisprudence in Australia that is relevant to the Brethren children. I look 
specifically at the possibility that a Brethren child, for religious reasons, may not 
wish to remain in contact with a parent who has left the faith community.  
It is useful to provide comments about the terminology used in this article and 
to provide an outline of the research. This article refers to decisions of the Family 
Court and its appellate level jurisdiction, the Full Court of the Family Court of 
Australia (“Full Court”). The article also cites decisions of Australia’s highest 
court, the High Court of Australia (“High Court”), and state courts. Where the 
italicized case citations referred to in this article include a number in parentheses 
in addition to the year of the judgment, this number is a reference to the 
paragraph or page of the relevant judgment. The full case citations appear at the 
end of this article. The majority of cases cited in this article are Brethren family 
law decisions of the Australian courts.  
The decisions of the Federal Circuit Court (which generally tends to hear less 
complex matters than the Family Court) are not discussed. There are references 
to the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“FLA”) and to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (“CRC”), but the article does not 
look in detail at Australian state or territory legislation. This work is exclusively 
about parenting orders for Brethren children. This review does not consider the 
implications of the analysis for other religious communities except to note that 
other researchers may critique and/or expand upon the research in this article in 
respect of other faith groups. This article does not review any of the 
jurisprudence in Australia relating to the best interests of the child under, say, 
child protection legislation in Australian states and/or territories. Nor does this 
work review human rights charters (to the extent these exist) in any Australian 
states and/or territories. 
The structure of this article is as follows. It first addresses the cornerstone legal 
principle—the best interests of the child—in the FLA, Australia’s key piece of 
Commonwealth family law legislation. The significance of the Brethren doctrine 
of “separation from evil” for parenting orders is considered. This work analyses 
the legal protections under the FLA for children’s religious beliefs, including 
with respect to the rights of children to freedom of religion under the CRC. In 
reviewing the FLA and its connection with the CRC, this article draws a 
distinction between a child’s right to freedom of religion under the CRC and the 
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recognition of a child’s religious beliefs and religious experiences as may be 
relevant to the child’s best interests under the FLA. It is proposed that, despite 
the incorporation of the CRC in the FLA, the FLA does not confer any right of a 
child to freedom of religion (Adhar and Leigh 2005, 203). 
In subsequent sections, this article looks at the methods the Family Court 
employs to hear and receive evidence from children, before the work considers in 
detail two Australian cases (the latter is actually a series of related cases) involving 
custody disputes about Brethren children. Some observations are offered about 
these judgments before the work briefly considers, in the final section, the 
possible implications for other faith communities of the legal analysis undertaken 
in this article. 
 
The Paramount Consideration 
 
Under the FLA, the Family Court must regard the best interests of the child as 
the paramount consideration when making a parenting order (FLA, s.60CA). 
Under the FLA (section 3, Definitions), a child is defined as a person under 18 
years of age only for the purpose of parenting orders (Shackel 2016, 40). While 
the FLA includes no definition of parent, the High Court has held that the  
ordinary, accepted English meaning of the word “parent” is a question of fact and degree 
to be determined according to the ordinary, contemporary understanding of the word 
“parent” and the relevant facts and circumstances of the case at hand (Masson v Parsons 
2019, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ [857]). 
The Family Court may deny custodial access to a parent if it considers that 
granting the parent access to their child would not be in the child’s best interests 
(Cooper v Cooper 1977). 
When determining what is in a child’s best interests, a primary consideration 
for the Family Court is that of the child having a meaningful relationship with 
their parents (FLA, s.60CC[2]). The Family Court will presume (where there is 
more than one parent) that it is in the best interests of the child for the parents to 
have equal shared parental responsibility for their child (FLA, s.61DA[1]). This 
presumption does not, however, necessarily mean equal parental time (FLA, note 
to s.61DA[1]). The presumption about equal shared responsibility being in the 
child’s best interests is rebuttable (FLA, s.61DA[4]). 
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The Family Court must assess the best interests of the child by reference to 
contemporary standards and not from the point of view of only one parent 
(Horman, in Marriage of 1976). If a court is asked to address religious questions 
in a custody matter, the paramount consideration is the children’s welfare (“best 
interests” in the FLA’s terminology) and not whether one religion is inherently 
preferable to another (Ex Parte Paul; Re Paul 1963). It has long been established 
in Australian family law that there is no presumption in favor of the mother over 
the father of a child in custody orders (Gronow v Gronow 1979). 
 
The Significance of Brethren Religious Practices 
 
Brethren religious practices can pose complexities for the Family Court when 
it is assessing applications for parenting orders for the children of separated 
Brethren parents. There are two reasons for this. First, the Brethren faith 
community has a strict approach towards what the Brethren community considers 
to be “sin.” A Brethren member who is alleged to have engaged in what their faith 
community regards as serious sin (e.g., adultery) will be temporarily shut out of 
the group’s religious life (“shutting up”) or may be permanently expelled and 
“withdrawn from” (Doherty 2013, 29). Being withdrawn from involves the total 
removal of social contact from the Brethren member.  
The practice of being withdrawn from reflects the Brethren belief in 
“separation from evil” (Doherty 2012, 165). A core Brethren value, this practice 
demonstrates to the former member, and all others who are associated with the 
accused person, the group’s condemnation of that person’s sinfulness. The 
resultant abandoning of social contact from the (former) member typically 
includes everyone who is connected with, and/or is or related to, the person, and 
the disassociation extends to meetings of the Brethren faith outside the person’s 
immediate community. This is an outgrowth of the connexional nature of 
Brethren ecclesiology.  
Secondly, whether as a result of their having experienced shunning, or for 
other reasons relating to their separation or exclusion from the Brethren group, 
an ex-Brethren parent may come to hold different views about the suitability of 
the faith community for their child’s upbringing than the perspective the parent 
held while they were still in the group. The ex-Brethren parent may come to 
believe that their child’s experience of, say, sport, education, cultural awareness, 
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or sexuality, would be more beneficial for their child by the child being part of the 
secular community than by their remaining in, or being in contact with, the 
Brethren group. The changed opinions of the ex-Brethren parent can lead to 
potentially irreconcilably different testimonies about what each parent considers 
to be in their child’s interests. In addition, the child and the parent who has left 
the faith community may come to hold different views about whether the child’s 
contact with that ex-Brethren parent is consistent with the child’s Brethren 
beliefs. These differences (i.e., between parent and parent; and between parent 
and child) can contribute to delays in resolving the parenting orders for the child.  
These two features of Brethren religious practice—the first doctrinal, and the 
second, a practical outworking of doctrine—have important implications for 
custody arrangements for the children of separated Brethren parents. If the faith 
community withdraws from a Brethren child’s parent, then the child who is still in 
the faith community may find it troubling to be in contact with their (now) ex-
Brethren parent. Specifically, due to the Brethren child’s adherence to the 
doctrine of separation from evil, perhaps influenced by some within their own 
faith community (including siblings), the Brethren child may prefer to avoid 
contact with that ex-Brethren parent. Even more specifically, a Brethren child 
may believe, for religious reasons—like the faith community to which they 
belong—that they should have no contact with a “sinning’ former member, even 
if that ex-member is their parent. What is more, any ongoing involvement with 
the Brethren faith community may tend to exacerbate any reservations or negative 
perspectives a child has about their relationship with their ex-Brethren parent. 
For example, the child may perceive that the quality of the child’s religious 
experience in the faith group diminishes if the child’s own Brethren community 
tends, as a result of the child’s contact with the ex-Brethren parent, to be less 
inclusive of the child in matters of worship.  
These aspects of Brethren community life can, as suggested, present 
difficulties for the Family Court in its weighing the interests of the parents in 
custody matters and, most importantly, in its determining, as the Family Court 
must do, what is in the child’s best interests. In the case of a Brethren child, the 
Family Court may have to balance the child’s potential perception of their 
betrayal of the norms of the faith community with the competing desires of the 
parents to be part of the child’s life, while one parent is inside the faith 
community and the other is outside it. In doing so, the Family Court must, 
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however, adhere to a presumption that shared parental responsibility is in the best 
interests of the child (FLA, s.61DA[1]). 
 
Legal Protection for a Brethren Child’s Religious Beliefs and Practices 
 
As noted in the previous section, the statutory principles in the FLA require 
the Family Court to presume—the presumption is rebuttable—that it is the best 
interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared responsibility. 
This raises a critical evidential question in custody disputes about Brethren 
children. Under the FLA, can a Brethren child’s preference for not having any 
contact with their own ex-Brethren parent for religious reasons, plausibly be 
characterized as an exercise of the child’s right to freedom of religion? 
The Australian courts have considered Brethren religious practices in several 
custody cases without defining the legal “rights” of Brethren children in respect 
of freedom of religion. In an early decision in the Supreme Court of NSW, Selby J 
awarded custody to the father of four children after the children’s mother joined 
the Brethren. Selby J cautioned that it was not for a court to determine whether 
one religion is inherently preferable to another, but his Honor decided in that 
case that the benefits to the children of remaining in the care of their mother were 
offset by the mother’s unbalanced and extravagant beliefs (Ex Parte Paul; Re Paul 
1963). 
In Mauger v Mauger (1966) in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Hart J 
decided that the Brethren father of three children was unfit to have their custody. 
Hart J awarded custody of the children to the mother, finding that it was “very 
much against the children’s interests to allow them to be brought up in the tenets 
of the sect” (487). On appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland, the Full Court upheld Hart J’s decision despite Skerman J’s notable 
dissent. Skerman J considered that the evidence before the Family Court did not 
justify a departure from what his Honor described as “the accepted presumption” 
that contact with both parents was in the interests of the children (313). Skerman 
J proposed that a form of access could be devised whereby the father would have 
limited opportunity to exercise any religious influence on the children (Bates 
1974, 344). 
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In another Brethren custody case, the Full Court of the Family Court held that 
the trial judge had placed undue significance on one Brethren parent’s beliefs and 
had not adequately addressed the interests of the children (In the Marriage of 
PLOWS [No 2] 1979). The Full Court in that case accordingly made an order for 
joint custody with the father to have care and control of the children on weekends 
so as to potentially to limit the mother’s religious influences (Bates 1983, 349). 
In another Brethren custody matter (In the Marriage of Grimshaw; Arkcoll 
[Intervener] 1981), the Full Court of the Family Court criticized a trial judge for 
his allowing the case to become a trial of the Brethren religion rather than 
ensuring that the welfare of the children was the paramount consideration. In a 
1998 judgment relating to Brethren (In the Marriage of Firth; Firth and Firth, 
Boyer [Intervener] 1988), the Full Court of the Family Court held that it is 
legitimate for the Family Court to consider the tenets of the parents’ faith in 
determining questions of parental access because this can be relevant to 
determining what is in the best interests of the child; the Full Court in that case 
linked the question of faith to the cornerstone principle in the FLA. Similarly, in 
1998, in H v H, the Full Court of the Family Court held that judges are obliged to 
consider the views and practices of the Brethren not to judge their value but to 
determine the effects of those views and practices on the children (Thornthwaite 
2011, 67).  
The FLA has, since 2012, included in it, an “additional object” of giving effect 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (“CRC”). Coming into 
effect on 7 June 2012, the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence 
and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth) (“Family Law Amendment Act”) amended 
the FLA to include in Pt VII of the FLA (which governs parenting arrangements 
for children) an additional object of giving effect to the CRC (section 60B[4] 
FLA). Like the FLA, the CRC recognizes that the best interests of the child are a 
(cfr. the use of the word the, in the FLA) primary consideration (Article 3.1). The 
CRC also, relevantly, comprises Article 14.1 which states that “States Parties 
(such as Australia) shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion” (emphasis added). 
As a result of the incorporation of the CRC into the FLA, it is theoretically 
possible for the Family Court to recognize the right of a child to freedom of 
religion under Article 14.1 of the CRC. As noted, however, section 60B(4) 
describes giving effect to the CRC as an “additional object.” There is an 
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argument that, being only an additional object, this object lacks the statutory 
gravitas of the statutory objects in section 60B(1) of the FLA (Parkinson 2012). 
Aside from this point, under Australian law, a Convention (such as the CRC) is 
not legally binding unless the Convention is incorporated into Australian law via 
domestic legislation (Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh 
1995 [Teoh]) (Jones 1999, 136). The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
legislation which introduced the “additional object” of giving effect to the CRC 
makes it clear that the CRC was not intended to be incorporated into the FLA. It 
provides that: the CRC is not incorporated into Australian domestic law; the 
Family Court can rely upon giving effect to the CRC as an object of the FLA only 
if there is some legislative ambiguity in the FLA; and the CRC prevails over the 
FLA only to the extent of any inconsistency between the terms of the FLA and the 
CRC (Ex Memo para 23, 7).  
There is on the face of the laws no obvious inconsistency between the FLA and 
the CRC in respect of the religious beliefs of a child (Brethren or otherwise) who 
is the subject of an application for a parenting order. It is possible that, in a 
specific case, there might be a legal inconsistency. Perhaps some ambiguity in the 
terms of the FLA may emerge. Yet, in general terms, there appears to be no 
overlap (inconsistency) or ambiguity for the CRC to address in respect of the FLA 
and parenting orders for children. As a result, it is my view that section 60B(4) of 
the FLA confers no obvious right to freedom of religion on a child under the 
CRC. This reasoning in turn suggests that the Family Court might commit an 
error of law if it were to base a parenting order decision on a child’s right to 
freedom of religion. It follows that, without more specific information as may 
arise in evidence in a particular custody case, there is a theoretical possibility that 
the Family Court would consider the best interests of a child by reference to the 
child having a right to freedom of religion under Article 14.1 of the CRC. It is, 
however, no more likely than a theoretical possibility.  
By way of recap, the legal analysis at this point is about the relationship 
between the FLA and the CRC and specifically whether the Family Court can 
consider the right of a child to freedom of religion in respect of a parenting order. 
I have suggested that the Family Court could not specifically rely on the CRC to 
find that a Brethren child has a right to freedom of religion because the CRC is 
not part of Australian domestic law. 
Parenting Orders for Brethren Families in Australia 
 
  $ The Journal of CESNUR | 5/2 (2021) 113—134 121 
This reasoning is not intended to understate the significance of the CRC in 
Australia. The High Court, Australia’s highest court, has commented on the 
significance of the CRC. For example, Mason CJ and Deane J wrote in Teoh that 
Australia’s ratification of the CRC gave rise to a 
legitimate expectation …. [t]hat administrative decision-makers will act in conformity 
with the Convention and treat the best interests of the children as a “primary 
consideration.” 
Their Honors’ opinion may be contrasted with the judgment of Callinan J in 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 
who stated that the CRC was merely “aspirational.” Clearly, the CRC is an 
important touchstone for administrative decision-making. There may also be 
grounds for the Family Court to use the CRC as a guide to respect a child’s rights 
to freedom of religion for, as the High Court advised in Teoh, administrative 
decision makers can be expected to make decisions that conform with the terms 
of the CRC.  
It does not, however, follow from this brief review of the status of the CRC in 
Australian law that the Family Court is unable to take a child’s religious beliefs 
into account in relation to assessing and making parenting orders. The significant 
number of Brethren family law cases in which the Family Court and other 
Australian courts have grappled with testimony about Brethren religious practices 
is itself testimony to the fact that Brethren religious matters are an important part 
of even the existing body of family law jurisprudence in Australia. Further, as will 
shortly be contended, although there is no reference to religion in the FLA, the 
FLA itself can and does clearly allow the Family Court to consider questions 
about the relevance of a child’s religious beliefs in respect of parenting orders.  
To expand upon this analysis, section 60B(1)(a) of the FLA states that an 
object of the FLA is to ensure that the best interests of a child are met by both 
their parents having a meaningful role in the child’s life to the maximum extent 
this is consistent with the child’s best interests. The legislative tenets in the FLA 
supporting the objective in section 60B(1)(a) include the principle that: children 
have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents (FLA, s.60B[2][a] 
[emphasis added]); children have the right to spend time on a regular basis with, 
and communicate on a regular basis with, both parents and other people 
significant to their care, welfare and development (e.g., grandparents) (FLA, 
s.60B[2][b] [emphasis added]); and children have the right to enjoy their culture 
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(FLA, s.60B[2][e] [emphasis added]). These legislative principles do not, 
however, apply where shared parental responsibility would not be in the child’s 
best interests (FLA, s.60B[2]). 
These above-mentioned provisions expressly recognized that rights of children 
are framed as some of the key principles of Pt VII of the FLA (Young 2017, 385) 
but do not include any right to freedom of religion. This point notwithstanding, 
section 60B(1)(a) of the FLA states that an object of the FLA is to ensure that the 
best interests of a child are met by both their parents having a meaningful role in 
the child’s life to the maximum extent this is consistent with the child’s best 
interests. By referring to the maximum extent the custody arrangement is 
consistent with the child’s best interests, section 60B(1)(a) of the FLA implicitly 
recognizes that there are, or may be, limitations on the desirability of parents 
having a role—equal or otherwise—in their child’s life. This view of the scope of 
section 60B(1)(a) is also consistent with there being a rebuttable presumption in 
the FLA about joint parental responsibility being in the child’s best interests 
(FLA, s.61DA[4]).  
In the context of a custody dispute about a Brethren child, the evidence before 
the Family Court could establish that an order for the ex-Brethren parent to have 
custody of the child could create mental anguish for the child if the child believes 
it is “wrong”—for religious reasons—for them to spend time with the parent who 
has left the Brethren community. The child may feel that their ability to worship as 
a full member of the faith community is diminished as a result of them having any 
ongoing contact with their ex-Brethren parent. If the Family Court is satisfied 
that a shared parenting arrangement is not consistent with the child’s best 
interests because the child would experience guilt by being with an ex-Brethren 
parent or that such ongoing contact may diminish the quality of the child’s 
religious life (say, their worship), then the Family Court may decide against 
awarding a shared parenting order. Importantly, the Family could do so within the 
legislative framework of the FLA (without reliance upon the CRC) and without 
the Family Court concluding that such an order would undermine the child’s right 
to freedom of religion.  
Other provisions of the FLA support the view that the Family Court can take 
into account a child’s religious freedoms under the FLA when the Family Court is 
making a parenting order and that the Family Court can do so without reliance on 
the CRC. For example, section 60B(1)(a) requires that the involvement of 
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parents in their child’s life is “meaningful.” If an ex-Brethren parent’s 
involvement in their child’s life could trouble the child’s conscience because the 
child believes for religious reasons that they should have no contact with that ex-
Brethren parent, then a joint custody arrangement could be described as less 
“meaningful” for the child than is required by the statutory connotation of that 
term. The Family Court could, in such a case, conclude that a joint custody 
arrangement would not be in the child’s best interests because the child’s 
religious experience is more beneficial for the child by that child having contact 
only with their Brethren parent. 
It must be said that any sole-parenting order awarded only to a Brethren parent 
is not a decision that the Family Court could ever reach lightly, for the Family 
Court must be satisfied that there is enough evidence before the Family Court to 
rebut the statutory presumption that shared parenting responsibility is in the 
child’s best interests. The Family Court would need to be convinced on the 
evidence before it that the child’s circumstances were exceptional (Cooper v 
Cooper 1977). An additional consideration is that such an order by the Family 
Court could be hurtful for the parent who has left the faith community. This is not 
itself a reason for the Family Court to deny making an order for sole parenting in 
favor of a Brethren parent, for the legislative reference point is the best interests 
of the child. Yet, a parent from whom the Brethren faith community has 
permanently “withdrawn” itself will have already lost all bonds with their former 
faith community. As one author puts it, 
excommunication has profound consequences for individuals and families, as community 
members have no friends outside the movement, but intense mutual reliance and 
affection within it (Thornthwaite 2011, 55).  
An order for sole parenting in favor of the Brethren parent would remove the 
possibility of the ex-Brethren parent having any connection with their child as a 
child. The emotional suffering of an ex-Brethren parent who loses all contact with 
their offspring could, if the child knows of this, also greatly distress the child.  
To conclude the reasoning in this section, the absence of any specific reference 
in the FLA to a child’s religious rights would not prevent the Family Court from 
taking a Brethren child’s religious beliefs into account when the Family Court is 
assessing the best interests of the child. The Family Court could, under the FLA, 
conclude, based on the evidence before it, that it is more beneficial than not for a 
Brethren child to not spend time with an ex-Brethren parent based on the child’s 
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religious beliefs and, possibly, there being greater religious benefits for the child 
as a result of the child being able to experience Brethren religious life without any 
contact with their ex-Brethren parent. This could be because contact with the ex-
Brethren parent would cause guilt for the child or because such an order would 
diminish the quality of the Brethren child’s religious experiences as a member of 
the faith community. Crucially, the Family Court could make such a finding 
without relying upon Article 14.1 of the CRC and without the Family Court 
needing to assert that an order of this kind is based on the Brethren child having a 
right to freedom of religion. 
 
Hearing Evidence from Brethren Children 
 
The Family Court is not an inquisitorial body. It must distil evidence based on 
submissions presented to it by parties presenting potentially contested views. It 
must also find a way to hear evidence from children—including Brethren 
children—that is as unthreatening as possible for the children given the litigious 
context of the proceedings.  
The FLA endeavors to ensure that the Family Court can hear the evidence of 
children with as little inconvenience as is possible for the children in the 
circumstances and in order to not cause the children unnecessary distress 
(Shackel 2016, 47). While the Family Court can inform itself of a child’s views by 
reference to a conference ordered pursuant to 11F of the Act, a more common 
method of the Family Court ascertaining a child’s evidence is under a Family 
Report ordered pursuant to section 62G of the FLA. It is possible for the Family 
Court to obtain evidence from a child by affidavit, video conference, closed circuit 
television, or by other electronic means of communication (Rule 15.02, FLA). 
The giving of evidence by children in oral evidence in court or in the judge’s 
chambers is typically not encouraged (In the Marriage of Joannou 1985).  
The maturity of a Brethren child is an important consideration in relation to 
the perspective of that child. Section 60CC(3)(a) of the FLA requires the Family 
Court to take into account any views expressed by the child and any other factors 
(e.g., the child’s maturity) that the Family Court thinks are relevant to the weight 
it should give to the child’s perspective. The nature of the child’s relationship 
with their parents is relevant (section 60CC[3][b]), as is, for example, the extent 
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to which the child’s parents have been involved in the making of, or in failing to 
make, long term decisions about the child (section 60CC[3][c]).  
As described in section 60CC(3)(a) referred to above, a key factor in the 
Family Court weighing the evidence of a Brethren child about their religious 
beliefs would be the child’s maturity. The FLA (section 64[1]) previously drew a 
distinction between children aged 14 years and over, and children under 14. 
Section 64(1) presumptively required the Family Court to make a decision which 
was consistent with the wishes of a child who was, due to their age, presumed to 
be mature. By 1983, however, this legislative principle was abolished because it 
came to be recognized that rather than empowering children of such an age, the 
rule placed an undue burden on the children. The Family Court now considers a 
child’s maturity without presuming that the child is mature (or immature) by 
reference to the age of 14. A child’s age (including whether the child is over 14) 
is not a determinative consideration in respect of the Family Court’s assessment 
of the level of the child’s maturity. 
 
Two Key Australian Cases 
 
The cases reviewed in this section are two Family Court decisions (the latter is 
more accurately described as a series of decisions relating to the one family 
dispute) about Brethren custody disputes. The first decision reviewed—a case 
decided by the Full Court of the Family Court—tested an important 
constitutional question about the possible religious freedoms of Brethren 
children. By contrast, as will be seen, the second case posed seemingly 
insurmountable evidential and legal challenges for the Family Court about the 
religious freedoms of Brethren children. The matters the latter case touched on 
include the kinds of considerations that the Family Court may need to address in 
future cases about parenting orders for children of Brethren parents (or possibly 
children in other faith communities) by reference to the legislative framework 
described in the earlier sections of this article.  
The first case to be reviewed in this section—In the Marriage of Firth; Firth 
and Firth, Boyer [Intervener] 1988—involved a custody application for Brethren 
children. The Full Court of the Family Court heard legal arguments about the 
possible religious freedoms of two Brethren children to continue to have contact 
with members of their Brethren faith community. The children who were the 
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subject of the custody dispute were a girl and a boy, the youngest children of four 
siblings of Brethren parents. Their parents married in 1965 and separated in 
1983 when the mother left the matrimonial home with the couple’s eldest child, 
her daughter. At the relevant times, the family lived in Tamworth, in New South 
Wales, Australia. The second eldest child—a boy—remained with his father, 
then lived with his Brethren maternal grandparents and with other relatives, 
before returning to live with his father. The two youngest children of the marriage 
(the girl and boy) went into the care of their maternal grandparents and continued 
in their care and in the Brethren community.  
The mother filed an application in the Family Court for custody of her eldest 
daughter as well as for custody of the two youngest children. By the time the 
proceedings commenced in the Family Court, the eldest daughter was 18 years 
old (and living with her mother); as a result, the eldest daughter was by then no 
longer the subject of any custody application. The mother’s application for 
custody instead then concerned only the two younger children who remained in 
the care of their maternal grandparents. Upon the husband being served with 
writs for custody, the husband brought the proceedings to the attention of the 
maternal grandparents. They then intervened in the legal proceedings and sought 
orders for themselves to have custody of the two youngest children, with access to 
the children to also be available to the husband and the wife. 
At first instance, Cook J in the Family Court dismissed the grandparents’ 
applications and granted sole guardianship of the two youngest children to the 
mother. Cook J decided inter alia that, for at least 12 months, the father, maternal 
grandparents, and members of the Brethren community could have no access to 
the children without the mother’s written consent. The grandparents lodged an 
appeal with the Full Court and sought an order for joint access to the two children 
with reasonable access to be granted to the children’s mother. The father 
responded by filing a cross-appeal, pleading that the grandparents should have 
custody of the children with reasonable access to himself or, in the alternative, 
that he should have sole guardianship of the children with reasonable access to 
the grandparents. The father later conceded that, if the grandparents had custody 
of the children, then their mother should also have access to the children. 
Before the Full Court of the Family Court, the appellants (the maternal 
grandparents) contended that Cook J’s decision in the first instance to suspend 
access between the children and the Brethren faith community prevented the 
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children from pursuing the children’s religious beliefs. The grandparents 
submitted that the trial judge had given insufficient weight to the children’s desire 
to continue in their faith and that his Honor had not adequately considered the 
disruptive effects of change upon the children as a result of his Honor’s orders.  
The grandparents couched their submissions before the Full Court in terms of 
the religious freedoms of the children, and they sought to make out their case on 
constitutional grounds. Section 116 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (“Constitution”) prohibits the Commonwealth from making laws for 
proscribed purposes, including for prohibiting the free exercise of religion. In 
order to make this constitutional argument, the appellants had to persuade the 
Full Court that Cook J’s orders at first instance were a law of the Commonwealth 
and were for prohibiting the children’s free exercise of religion. They contended 
in this regard that Cook J’s order to suspend access between the children and 
members of the Brethren faith community contravened section 116 of the 
Constitution by preventing the children from freely pursuing their religious 
beliefs. The grandparents also pleaded that the courts must adopt a neutral 
position with respect to religion (not preferring one religion against the other) 
and that Cook J, had not been neutral in his Honor’s decision-making. 
If these constitutional arguments were to be successful, then the Full Court of 
the Family Court would have had to accept the appellants’ contention that Cook 
J’s judgment amounted to a law made by the Commonwealth and that his Honor’s 
orders were for prohibiting the children from freely exercising their religion. The 
Full Court of the Family Court rejected these arguments. It held that Cook J’s 
orders did not breach section 116 of the Constitution. Its reasoning in rejecting 
the appellants’ section 116 claim was consistent with the High Court’s 
interpretations of section 116 of the Constitution (see, e.g., Adelaide Company 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth 1943), including 
judgments that section 116 applies only to the making of Commonwealth 
legislation (Attorney General [Vic]; Ex rel Black v Commonwealth 1981 
[Barwick CJ]), and therefore would not constitutionally govern a judicial 
decision. According to this reasoning of the High Court, judicial orders could not 
amount to the making of a Commonwealth law as contemplated by section 116. 
Accordingly, there would be no scope for any applicant for a parenting order 
under the FLA to successfully argue that a parenting order of the Family Court 
infringes a constitutional freedom by limiting a child’s free exercise of religion.  
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The decision of the Full Court in In the Marriage of Firth; Firth and Firth, 
Boyer [Intervener] (1988) may be contrasted with the proceedings in the Family 
Court in Peter & Elspeth (2009), a protracted custody dispute also involving 
Brethren children. Such is the significance of Peter & Elspeth in Australian family 
law that it is necessary to trace this decision to its roots.  
The review of this case therefore begins with the earlier case of Elspeth & Peter 
(2006) involving the same disputing parents as in Peter & Elspeth. Elspeth and 
Peter married in May 1977 and separated in February 2003. Both were members 
of the Brethren community in Tasmania. Over the course of their 25-year 
marriage, the two parents had eight children, all raised as Brethren. The father 
came to want to leave the Brethren community for the less restrictive Open 
Brethren group. In early 2003, the father left the Brethren community to live in a 
de facto relationship, and he chose to no longer follow the Brethren tenets. The 
father’s decision to leave the Brethren precipitated the parties’ separation and 
divorce, which led to the protracted custody litigation in the Family Court in 
respect of three (L, J and C), and, as time passed, and the children grew older, 
only the two (J and C) youngest children of the marriage. 
Benjamin J in the Family Court of Australia in 2006 in Elspeth & Peter 
adjudged that it was in the three youngest children’s best interests to continue 
living with their mother while spending time separately with their father. His 
Honor observed that the lives of the children were steeped in the Brethren 
religious beliefs and attitudes (361). Despite his awarding joint custody, 
Benjamin J accepted the evidence of a sociologist (whose qualifications, including 
as a counsellor and mediator were not challenged) that the behavior of certain 
family members and other members of the group in counselling the children to 
only tolerate spending time with their father amounted to psychologically cruel 
and abusive behavior towards the children (239). This finding by his Honor was 
not overturned in the later court cases. 
Three years after Benjamin J’s decision, Brown J in the Family Court decided 
the case of Peter & Elspeth. By this time, there were only two children of the 
former marriage below the age of 18 who were then the subject of the custody 
proceedings: J (aged 15) and C (aged 10). In the time since the original decision 
of Benjamin J, the father had commenced proceedings against the mother and 
others whom he alleged facilitated contraventions of the Family Court’s orders. 
Benjamin J found these claims proven; however, the Full Court of the Family 
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Court later quashed the convictions except in respect of the mother, whose 
conviction stood. By the time the Full Court of the Family Court made these 
decisions, the children’s mother had been diagnosed with a recurrence of breast 
cancer and she was critically ill. The Full Court of the Family Court required the 
mother to pay costs, but it imposed no other sanction on her. 
In contrast to Benjamin J’s judgment in 2006, Brown J in 2009 awarded sole 
custody to the mother of the two youngest children. A consideration central to 
her Honor’s reasoning in the 2009 decision was that, if the children were to live 
with their father, they would be exposed to influences and practices that were 
contrary to the children’s beliefs and those of their mother, siblings, extended 
family, and friends (211). Brown J considered that exposing the children to such 
influences would be distressing for them (213). Her Honor also held that the 
continuation of litigation after the mother’s diagnosis of breast cancer in 2007 
had driven the two youngest children further from their father (213). Brown J 
could find no benefit to the children in her Honor making orders which required 
them to spend time with their father, and her Honor could conceive of no 
prospect of the children having a meaningful relationship with him in the 
foreseeable future (221).  
A critical issue to emerge from the judgment of Brown J was the weight to be 
given to the intentions of an ex-Brethren parent (in this case, the father) who 
wishes to instruct their child/children about the possible alternatives to life 
within the Brethren community. Related to this question was the relevance of the 
children’s religious freedoms and the nature of these freedoms. The father in 
Peter & Elspeth was candid about his wanting to show his children other ways of 
life and of his intention to release them from what he described as the Brethren 
community’s “clutches” (209). The father was, nevertheless, prepared to 
accommodate the children’s Brethren beliefs and practices, at least to an extent. 
For example, the father said he would encourage the children to continue with 
their Sunday Bible readings and potentially that he would let them go to Sunday 
School (141). Yet, the father would not countenance his children attending 
Brethren meetings (although he was happy for the children to enjoy social 
interactions before and after the meetings) because, he said, he was concerned 
that the children would listen to messages of indoctrination against him (141). 
To further complicate matters, it appears that the father had understood, 
correctly, that his children would probably not want to see him if they had a choice 
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(161). The next eldest sibling of J and C (their sister L) made L’s views clear 
about not wanting to see her father in a note she gave to her mother on 1 June 
2007 which referred to the father’s “itchy, bitchy, witchy, fitchy house” (111). 
While conceding that his children would not choose to see him if they had a 
choice, the father nevertheless contended that no weight should be put on the 
views expressed by his children as, he said, the views were a product of Brethren 
indoctrination (157). 
The father’s contention about his children’s “brainwashing” belied the father’s 
suspicions about the Brethren community’s potentially covert methods, a claim 
seemingly difficult for Brown J to accept given the father had been with the group 
for 40 years (17). Her Honor accepted that the two younger Brethren children 
were “heavily influenced” by their older siblings and that it was not realistic to 
expect the children to oppose the views of the older siblings and the teachings of 
their church (159). Brown J also adjudged that, unless the views of the older 
siblings changed, it was unlikely that J and C’s views would alter “at least in the 
foreseeable future” (159).  
Brown J appeared to describe a contest between the choices of the father to 
restrict C’s activities in the Brethren faith (i.e., to impose his choices on her) and 
the 10-year-old C’s competing choice to maintain her commitment to her faith, 
that is to exercise her religious freedom (159). The evidence before Benjamin J in 
the earlier Family Court hearings had suggested that, if the children left the group 
to be with the father, then it was unlikely that they would be “withdrawn from,” 
but they would not be able to fully partake in Brethren fellowship (93). Brown J 
acknowledged the Brethren group’s aspiration that children in the faith not be 
exposed to worldly influences and that the children not become friends with non-
Brethren children (160). The father pressed the Family Court to recognize the 
benefits to the children of their experiencing ways of life other than those in the 
Brethren community. Her Honor, however, rejected the father’s submissions 
about the benefits for the children of their experiencing another way of life. 
The circumstances of the children’s tragically ill mother made Brown J’s task of 
adjudicating this matter particularly difficult for the Family Court. Denying the 
children exclusive contact with their mother during the final stages of her life 
could have caused great distress for the children irrespective of the children’s 
religious beliefs. Yet, the earlier evidential finding by Benjamin J stood 
unrefuted: there was evidence of psychologically abusive behavior towards the 
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children by some family members and other members of the Brethren community 
(Elspeth & Peter 239). Brown J’s decision seemed to not to take that behavior 
into consideration. 
Central to the Family Court’s assessment of the best interests of the children in 
Peter & Elspeth was the Family Court’s concern about the children being exposed 
to influences outside the Brethren faith community that would conflict with their 
religious beliefs. Brown J appeared to be specifically concerned that the 
children’s contact with their father could lead to the children having less than full 
participation in the practice of religious worship. The father was concerned that 
the children’s experience of life would be less rich by their remaining in the faith 
community than if the children experienced life outside the group. Brown J did 
not expressly reject the father’s contentions in the following terms, but the 
father’s argument did the children something of a disservice. Adults who 
voluntarily leave a faith community and then claim to fear their children will be 
“brainwashed” if the children remain in the faith group, likely have a weak case. 
Children are rarely entirely passive agents; they grow up into adults and may then 
have an opportunity, or experience the right circumstances, to test the group’s 
doctrines just as the parent did themselves. The parent in such a case has proved 
to their children that it is possible for their children to exercise their own 
religious freedom (however that concept is described) as an adult. These 
freedoms include the freedom to make choices, to leave the religion, to choose 
another religion, or invent a new one. The parent is living proof of how their 
children can, as adults, make free choices. 
 
Implications for the Brethren and Other Faith Communities 
 
This article has focused on parenting orders in respect of the children of 
Brethren parents. It has not reviewed family law cases about children in other 
religious communities, nor has this research examined family law decisions other 
than in Australia. The analysis in this article may nevertheless have implications 
for other faith groups, whether these communities be in Australia or elsewhere. 
An exclusive religious community that shuns a person for what the group believes 
to be that members’ sinfulness may lead to the child of that person not wanting 
contact with their parent. The child may believe that it is sinful/wrong to have 
contact with anyone from whom their faith community has withdrawn itself. The 
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child (and their faith community) may believe that the child’s contact with such an 
outsider (albeit their parent) will diminish the quality of the child’s religious 
experience in the group.  
More generally, children in any exclusive faith community, whether the 
Brethren or otherwise, emblematize renewal. Their very presence in such a group 
implies that the faith community has rejuvenating foundations, the kind of growth 
that can withstand a schism in a specific household. Retaining children in a faith 
community may be seen as countering the implication of the community’s 
declining relevance and, potentially, its dwindling numbers. These considerations 
may, in turn, make a specific family law dispute more significant for the faith 
community than is apparent from the sum of the parts in the dispute. The faith 
community may fight hard to retain its children. It may fund the costs of a 
protracted, difficult, and expensive legal dispute. It may be difficult for courts to 
distinguish the religious interests of a child from those of the members of the 
group that perceives there to be a need for the child to remain in it. 
Future cases in Australia and elsewhere may challenge, or distinguish, the 
arguments in this article that the FLA (or the CRC) does not confer upon a child 
any right freedom of religion in respect of parenting orders under the FLA. So, 
too, may scholars. There may be greater latitude for courts outside Australia, 
where other laws apply, to recognize legal rights of children to freedom of 
religion. Different jurisdictions or distinguishable circumstances may allow 
courts to give greater weight to legal contentions about the religious rights of 
children. Faith communities such as the Brethren may agitate for courts to 
recognize children’s rights in family law matters. These groups’ concerns may, 
over time, result in the faiths engaging in even more aggressive efforts to 
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